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Idea of Progress*
William van Caenegem
Associate Professor, School of Law, Bond University
SUMMARY
Many of the features of intellectual property regimes that are most consistent over time
arguably reflect the western belief in, or ideology of, material progress. The idea of
progress is typified by belief in the limitless accumulation of new knowledge, and the
potential for practical application of that knowledge; belief in the essential contribution
of the individual mind to generating valuable new insights; and belief that techno-
logical development will allow the ever expanding and ever changing desire for
material satisfaction to be met. A progressivist world view thus emphasises individual
creativity, the practical use of knowledge, and constant innovation and change. These
are all factors that play an important role in defining various forms of intellectual
property rights.          .
INTRODUCTION
Introductions to the study of intellectual property law commonly start with an analysis
of its policy bases.1 Two approaches usually dominate: the "economic" approach
(property rights as an incentive in a case of market failure in the market for informa-
tion), and the "personality rights" approach (creations of the mind are a reflection of
the creator’s personality and therefore subject to the creator’s control).2 The former is
* This article is based on a paper delivered to the Intellectual Property Law Teachers Workshop,
Murdoch University, Perth, February 12-14, 1996. The author is grateful to the participants for
comments that have been helpful in shaping this article. The author also thanks Professor Chris Arup
for his helpful comments on an earlier draft.
~ By "policy basis" the author means some external justification in terms of rationale or aim of the
system of intellectual property law as a whole, rather than an analysis of its internal coherence.
2 Drahos introduces an interesting and rigorous distinction between on the one hand, the instrumen-
talist approach (i.e. intellectual property law increases overall welfare levels and is therefore in the
public interest), and on the other hand, the propriatarian approach: individuals naturally deserve
property rights in abstract goods: see P. Drahos, A Philosophy of Intellectual Property (Dartmouth,
1996).
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said to be the bedrock on which common law intellectual property systems are built,
the latter prevails in civil law jurisdictions, and is reflected in a greater emphasis on
moral rights.3 Sometimes a reference to notions of "fairness" as justification for the
grant of intellectual property rights may also be made.4
However, in terms of intellectual property as a whole, both personality rights and
economic theories are unsatisfactory. The personality rights theory manifestly over-
states the case for a moral or ethical relationship between the author and all the various
forms of intellectual property,5 and exaggerates the notions of authorship and individ-
ual creativity. The economic thesis is strong on theory but short on empirical proof
supporting the creation of property (-type) rights in intellectual goods6; nor does it
establish a satisfactory link between economic growth and technological change, and
individual welfare. Furthermore, in recent global debates the potential negative social,
environmental and cultural impact of adherence to a purely market-based approach to
intellectual property has become apparent.7
Neither approach places intellectual property law in a wider cultural and social
context, and both risk becoming embroiled in historical revisionism. Saunders has
pointed out that a view of intellectual property (copyright in his discourse) as a pre-
determined process of development--early intellectual property law inevitably leading
to the modern rationally complete law--is historicist nonsense.8 Finding for the
3 "Moral Rights" is a somewhat misleading translation of the French term "droit moral". The Dutch
term is "persoonlijkheidsrechten" which would be "personality rights" in English: arguably more
enlightening terms.
4 Textbooks generally reflect the same approach: see for instance, in Australia, S. Ricketson, The Law
of Intellectual Property (Law Book Co, 1984) paras 1.6-1.14. Ricketson refers to the natural rights theory
and the fairness/incentive theory as the two main theoretical bases for intellectual property law.
5 Such a claim may be warranted to some degree in the context of copyright, but is far harder to
sustain in the context of trade marks, or circuit layouts, for instance.
6 The controversy concerning the demands of economic rationality is endless: a good example is the
ongoing doubt as to the causal relationship between patents law and industrialisation during the
industrial revolution; Coulter refers to economic historians’ unwillingness to assert a causal relation-
ship, see M. Coulter, Property in Ideas (Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1991) at p.3. Concerning the
history of patent law at that time and more generally, see also C. Macleod, Inventing the Industrial
Revolution: The English Patent System 1660-1800 (Cambridge University Press, 1988). See also concern-
ing the patents system in Australia, Lamberton, Mandeville, Bishop, Economic effects of the Australian
patent systeln (AGPS, Canberra, 1982). Famously, this study came to the conclusion that there were no
arguments for introducing a patent system if you do not already have it; and that there were also no
firm arguments for getting rid of it if you do have it. Machlup in a celebrated US study came to the
same conclusion: see Study of Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademakers and Copyrights, Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, "An economic Review of the Patent System"
15 (Comm Print 1958; by E Machlup). Other studies have concluded that some industries greatly rely
on patents, but that most attach little significance to them: see, e.g. Levin R. et al., "Appropriating the
returns from industrial research and development" (1987) 3 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
783.
7 For instance in relation to patents and the cost of essential drugs; patenting of genetically modified
organisms; patents and loss of control over traditional knowledge; global copyright and the cost of
education; and the relationship between patents and biodiversity.
8 Saunders D., "Dropping the subject: an argument for a possible history of authorship and the law
of copyright", in B. Sherman and A. Strowel (eds), Of Authors and Origins: Essays on Copyright Law
(Clarendon, 1994).
[2003] I.P.Q.: No. 3 © SWEET & MAXWELL LTD AND CONTRIBUTORS 2003
William van Caenegem 239
modern law some cohesive rational basis necessarily implies that "old" intellectual
property law did not conform to the modern standards of rationality because it was not
yet fully developed to its inevitable goal, while showing the unmistakable footprint of
such development. This notion undervalues historical reality.
But should intellectual property law then be seen as no more than an historical
phenomenon, an accident of the cultural, economic and socio-political factors at play
at some time in the past, that remains with us although the circumstances that gave
rise to it have ceased to exist?9 Historical analysis is interesting in itself, and helpful
in understanding the genesis and process of transformation of the law, but to be
significant in terms of future policy development we need to move beyond historical
data, to a continuous dialectic between historical fact and the aspirations of the-
ory.
The aim of this article is thus to steer a course between the rocks of excessive
instrumentalism and historical reductionism. It explores the relatively stable struc-
tures underlying intellectual property law, while recognising it as essentially a cul-
tural institution with historical roots. In that light, it focusses on a central cultural
belief underlying much of intellectual property law: the idea of, and the belief in
progress. This belief supports the (often unspoken) aspiration of western (European
in origin) society and culture, to improve the welfare of mankind by the application
of reason. It pervades culture and underscores the basic structure of a market-
oriented industrial society; however, this is not to say that the belief has been
universal, stable and uniform over the ages, as will be explored below. The belief in
progress has greatly influenced the development of intellectual property law; in a
"progressivist" society, intellectual property is a crucial institution.
Looking at intellectual property law from the perspective of such a belief may help
to understand some of the policy disputes and law reform questions of today. It may
also be that contemporary disillusion with many aspects of intellectual property law
parallels a crisis in the belief in progress. This crisis encourages policy makers to view
markets and market actors as the sole legitimate determinants of the rules of intellec-
tual property law, rather than being guided by a broader view of public welfare and
individual well-being.
EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
Emergence
There is some controversy concerning the prevalence of the idea of progress in ancient
times, i.e. in Greek and Roman civilisation and during the Christian era.1° The modern
9 The author treats intellectual property law here as a consequence of the development of a
progressivist materialistic society, not a cause or contributor to it. It is accepted that this discounts the
economic importance of intellectual property law. See in this vein, Coulter above n.6, concerning the
cause or effect controversy re patents law and industrialisation.10 See, e.g.R. Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress (Basic Books, 1970). Nisbet’s finding of a highly
developed idea of progress in the writings of the Christian fathers and of some of the ancients such as
Seneca and Lucretius is questioned as overstating the development and importance of the notion in
those times in C. Lasch, The True and Only Heaven; Progress and its Critics (W.W. Norton, 1991). See also
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notion of progress in European thought is said to have emerged in the seventeenth
century. But it had at least one important precursor in Roger Bacon,11 who first
advocated rational observation and experiment as a method of ascertaining truth,
heralding a dynamic rather than static view of truth and knowledge (the notion of
humans generating rather than receiving knowledge).12 Bacon also advocated the
notion that knowledge ought to bear fruit in science and industry, i.e. that it should
have practical application.13
Although these early rationalist beliefs, had the potential to undermine the Christian
world-view,~4 initially the prevailing notion was that mankind had achieved its
supreme state of moral and intellectual development during classic antiquity. The path
to true knowledge was by way of veneration and re-examination of the writings, such
as they were known, of the "’anciens". The study of classical authors such as Ptolemy,
Aristotle, and Galen, became the mainstay of the pursuit of knowledge, which was still
to be received rather than created. However, the "’modernes’" advocated the supremacy of
rational thought and observation over the study of the ancient texts; the future, rather
than history, would gradually reveal truth. They eventually "won" the battle with the
"anciens". Descartes, one of the foremost enlightenment rationalists, prescribed a
formula that amounted to an important methodological breakthrough: doubt every-
thing that is not certain, and only what is clear and distinct is certain.15 His approach
signalled the scientific revolution. Because it undermined religious and received truth,
it added to the unknown, but it also inspired confidence in the "knowability" of the
unknown because of the potential of the new methods of observation and rational
deduction.
Knowledge, reason and progress
With the endless possibilities of learning that the method of rational observation and
experiment and inductive analysis seemed to disclose, arrived the notion of progress:
J.B. Bury, The Idea of Progress, (London, 1920) (a standard work), and M. Ginsberg, "Progress in the
modern era", in Dictionary of the History of Ideas, Vol.3. Also V. Brome, The Problems of Progress (Cassell,
1963), and Holliday R., The Science of Human Progress, (Oxford University Press, 1981); S. Pollard, The
Idea of Progress: History and Society (Penguin, 1971); W. Wagar (ed.), The Idea of Progress Since the
Renaissance (Wiley, 1969). In anthropology see, e.g.J.H. Steward and D.B. Shimkin, "Some mechanisms
of socio-cultural evolution", in Evolution and Man’s Progress. In art see S. Gablik, Progress in Art (Rizzoli,
New York, 1977). On Marxism/dialectic materialism see J. Plamenatz, Man and society (Longmans,
1992), Vol.III: Marx and the idea of progress.
u Roger Bacon (1214-1292): his views on experimentation and mathematics as sources of knowledge
were rejected and opposed at the time and only received recognition in later centuries more abl~ to
deal with his revolutionary ideas. Author of Opus Maius ("Great Work"), the Opus Minus ("Smaller
Work") andthe Opus Tertium ("Third Work"), and the Communia Naturalium ("General Principles of
Natural Philosophy"), the Communia Mathematica ("General Principles of Mathematical Science").
12 In general see, e.g.E. Todd, The Causes of Progress (Basil Blackwell, 1987). Also Mokyr J., The Lever
of Riches (Oxford University Press, 1990).13 Some see this as Bacon’s major contribution to the modern world: see Sklair L., The Sociology of
Progress (Routledge, 1970).
14 Since they call into doubt predestination and the notion of individual spiritual salvation.
15 See R. Descartes, Discourse on Method, first published in 1637 (Modern Edition, Harvard Classics),
Vol.34, Pt 1.
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Pascal,16 Fontenelle17 and others believed in the continual progress of all mankind
based on the cumulative development of knowledge. Although some have maintained
that the notion of progress that emerged was a development of Christian notions of
progress, in truth it amounted to a rejection of many key Christian beliefs. Where St
Augustine referred to the journey from the City of Man to the City of God, he was
thinking of individual moral and spiritual progress, whereas the enlightenment
emphasised social and material progress. Thus the Christian notions of personal
spiritual salvation, predetermination and providence, reflected in Millenarian
thought,18 are clearly contrasted with notions of material and consequent social
advancement, the essence of a secular belief in progress. The secular idea of progress
emphasises the potential of the here and now, rather than viewing this world as a
precursor of, and personal proving ground for, the hereafter.
Knowledge accumulation and rehabilitation of want
Central to the early notion of progress that emerged and took shape in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, is the idea that human knowledge is irreversible and
cumulative, and that intellectual enlightenment will lead to greater happiness, liberty
and justice for all. Unlike in later times, early belief in progress was heroic, in the sense
that humans were seen as perfectible creatures, and that all scientists had to do was
find the secrets of both natural and social development. Knowledge would one day
accumulate sufficiently to allow all men to live as equals on the basis of rationality and
individual moral perfection: the potential was boundless. There would be no distinc-
tions between cultures, so-called "primitive" peoples having caught up and fallen in
line with the more developed nations.~9 This belief in progress was further bolstered by
evolutionism in natural science: Darwin’s vision of the natural world as an evolution-
ary process and not a fixed entity, and development from simple to complex organisms,
fitted well with a notion of the perfectibility of mankind based on progressively
acquired knowledge.2°
16Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), French mathematician, was responsible for many mathematical
advances (probability theory, integral calculus, etc.) and for attacking the scientific authority of the
church, mainly the Jesuits: see his Lettres Provinciales (1656-1657).17 Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657-1757), French author, supporter of the modernes.
18 The Christian idea that the end of the world would be predated by a golden age lasting 1000
years.
19 See Condorcet, Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, Marquis de (1743-94), French mathema-
tician; in his Sketch of a Historical Picture of the Human Mind (Progres de l’Esprit Humain, 1794) he
represented the human race as absolutely perfectible. As to social development: see Charles Fourier
(1772-1837), French utopian socialist and radical social reformist; Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Comte de
Saint-Simon (1760-1825), founder of French socialism; and Auguste Comte (1798-1857). Comte saw
social development as a three-stage process; he desired to put his theoretical understanding into
practice to improve societ}a20 Ch ....arles Darwin, The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, 1859. See also Herbert Spencer
who espoused evolutionary theories (Theories of Psychology, 1855) and "social Darwinism". On the
analogy sometimes drawn between technological "progress" and biological evolution, see, e.g. Steindl
J., Technical progress and evolution, in Sahal D. (ed.), Research, Development and Technological Innovation
(Lexington, 1980).
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Scientific progress provided mankind with a new mastery over its environment and
conditions.21 The notion of accumulating knowledge, hand-in-hand with a belief in its
practical utility, generated material progress. But as well as a recognition of the
potential for material development, the concept of progress also rested on the rehabili-
tation of want or desire, i.e. a personal desire for material improvement became
positively evaluated. This was a notion that the ancients or Christians did not always
share, seeing moral value in simplicity and frugality.22 It gave rise to a new science of
political economy, specifically aimed at maximising the satisfaction of want, i.e.
material welfare. Material advancement for all was to become a central progressivist
notion.
Material progress
The heroic idea of progress that prevailed during the seventeenth, eighteenth and
nineteenth century was thus based on three precepts: the cumulativeness of know-
ledge; the practical usefulness and application of knowledge for the satisfaction of
material wants and the solution of social problems; and the belief that the application
of knowledge would lead to a perfected man living in perfect conditions in a perfected
world. In this vision of a glorious future the belief in progress was akin to a relig-
ion.
However, events during the nineteenth and twentieth century sounded the death
knell for the belief in a secular utopia. Two world wars, industrial "mayhem",
unemployment, labour displacement, environmental degradation and economic uncer-
tainty are realities that undermined the heroic belief in progress, and gave rise to a
more modern and relative view. The notions of social and moral/personal perfectibility
were largely lost. The remaining essence of the progressivist view is that the irrever-
sible accumulation of knowledge will lead to a never-ending process of improvement;
a belief in progress as progress, not progress to an ideal outcome, but progress as
outcome. The only thing that remains certain is that nothing is certain, and that there
will be constant change. Lasch calls this impermanence the essence of modernity. The
view of humans as morally and socially perfectible creatures being lost, 9nly the notion
of progress as material accumulation and technological change remained.
Thus, in a very basic way, the modern social order with its overriding belief in
material progress is founded on science as the motor of new knowledge. Human wants
and needs are seen not as natural or inherent but historical and variable. Where the
idea of progress leading to an utopian society has mostly fallen away, what we are left
with is an idea of progress based on the ongoing satisfaction of new and varying wants
through the practical use of science; both generating and satisfying these wants is the
essence of a society in progress. Heroic progressivism has moulded into belief in the
21 For a different approach which emphasises the inherent determinants of technological change
rather than external inputs, see D. Sahal, Patterns of Technological Innovation (Addison Wesley, 1981).
22 As Lasch (see above n.10) points out, for Mandeville, Hume and Adam Smith it was the self-
generating character of rising expectation, new tastes and components that broke the old circle of
growth and decay and gave rise to a society capable of endless expansion.
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inescapable growth of science that will result in greater material welfare, and will
simultaneously generate and solve the problems of materialism.
Organisational progress and the emergence of intellectual property rights
With the acceptance of the potential for endless accumulation of knowledge, and of the
need to turn that knowledge to practical account, went the (moral and practical)
acceptance of material want (it being acceptable, relevant and even laudable, for every
person to seek to improve their material conditions). Material comfort was not to
remain something essentially reserved for a narrow elite or those entitled to it by birth,
but something to be acquired and aspired to by all. Society at the onset of the industrial
revolution responded to this new found generalised want with unique financial,
technological, political/administrative, and legal mechanisms that would enable mass
production and distribution of goods for all consumers. Thus material progress went
hand-in-hand with organisational progress: the development of new insights concern-
ing human organisation and institutions, largely structured around the central notion
of the market. The industrial revolution progressively provided both the goods that the
masses had come to aspire to acquire, the means (in income in salaries and wages) to
acquire them, and the necessary institutions to organise their acquisition, thus creating
something of a self-perpetuating engine of growth.
At the same time an increasing development of large scale co-operative systems, and
greater dependence on accumulation or resources and knowledge made voluminous
and cheap production possible, as well as distribution (e.g. by train; with the aid of the
telegraph), and enabled high levels of consumption and ownership. Society became
increasingly complex and based on specialisation, emphasising the uniqueness of the
individual (with special ability) and the importance of knowledge accumulation and
use.
It is not surprising that alongside innovations in administration,23 a notion of
intellectual property arose and gained credence at such a time as an organisational
instrument in a new market dependent on novelty, progress and constant change.24 It
reflected both the new attitude to property, the notion of a reward of property rights for
those who achieved more with less (for that is what successful new technologies m~st
do, increase the productivity of labour and real inputs), and also an increasing belief in
the unique contribution of the individual,as It matched the crucial progressivist notion
23 Coulter points out that the industrial revolution coincided with a governmental revolution based
largely on Benthamist theory and practical determinants (laissez fair as opposed to statist or inter-
ventionist administration), see Coulter (above n.6 at p.5).24 See further Sherman & Bentl~ The Making of Modern Intellectual Property Law (Cambridge
University Press, 1999).
25 See D. Saunders, above n.8. Saunders refers to the emergence during the 17th and 18th century of
the romantic individualistic notion of authorship, which he opposes to more structural or post-
constructivist notions that see the author as secondary to the text (or whatever other creation). See also
M. Rose, Authors and Owners, (Harvard University Press, 1993). See also P.O. Long, "Invention,
authorship, intellectual property, and the origin of patents: notes toward a conceptual history",
Technology & Culture, 1991, pp.846-84.
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that technological change or innovation would result in increased individual wel-
fare.
The creative individual
As well as the application of scientific method, it was the intellectual spark of the
individual inventor or thinker that made the constant accumulation of new knowledge
possible, and that enabled its practical use.26 Thinkers of those times, (such as Fourier,
Saint-Simon and Comte in the social sciences27) saw themselves as original thinkers.
They saw ideas as originating within their unique selves, reflecting an idealised
romantic view of creation, rather than a view of creation as some dialectical interaction
with the past, a reinterpretation, review or selection from history,as The above-
mentioned early sociologists also emphasised the essential egoistic competitiveness of
man, and Darwinism (the survival of the fittest and natural selection) seemed to
confirm those individualistic and competitive notions. Individual creativity became
viewed as an indispensable motor of progress in arts and sciences, leading, for instance,
to a view of art which emphasises originality above aesthetics. Modernism as individu-
ality was born of a belief in progress.
MODERN CRITIQUES OF THE BELIEF IN PROGRESS
The material merry-go-round
In modern times progress is viewed in a material rather than personal, social and
spiritual sense. Even so, although increases in material well-being do not necessarily
result in greater spiritual well-being, happiness or "satisfaction", it cannot be disputed
that health and minimal material comfort are preconditions for happiness.29 Nonethe-
less, contentment and satisfaction seem to depend on very basic elements of
26 During Elizabethan and earlier times the emphasis of patents law was on innovation, not
invention: most patents were awarded for importation of technologies and manufacture (import
franchises) rather than rewarding practical application of new knowledge in a theoretical or potential
sense: see Coulter, above n.6, at p.10; from the early 1700s the consideration of a patent grant became
publication of details rather than an obligation to put into practice; this seems to confirm the greater
emphasis that came to be placed on progress through generation of knowledge, and education and
dissemination as a generalised basis for intellectual property law (at p.15). The patent system was seen
by many industrialists of the industrial revolution as an important source of information (at p.24).
27 A8 pointed out by Brome, see above n.10.
28 For an interesting comparison with the prevailing view of creation in China during the period
when notions of intellectual property were developing in the West, see W.P. Alford, To Steal a Book is
an Elegant Offence: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilisation (Stanford University Press, 1995);
concerning authorship see Saunders, above n.8; also, e.g.M. Woodmansee, "The genius and the
copyright: economic and legal conditions of the emergence of the author" (1984) 17 Eighteenth Century
Studies 425. Concerning inventors, see F. Machlup, "Patents" in D. Sills (ed.) The International
Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences II: 46-471 (Macmillan, 1968). Machlup points out that the early
history of patents law owes more to the state’s desire to strengthen itself than to acknowledgment of
any inherent property interests of an inventor (as referred to in Alford, see above in this footnote).
29 See above, N. Rescher, Unpopular essays on technological progress (University of Pittsburgh Press,
1980).
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the human condition, factors largely untouched by technological progress,3° and it is
obvious that science and technology generate a lot of unhappiness and material
problems,31 such as environmental pollution, social isolation and deterioration of living
conditions. But in the contemporary view of progress, developing knowledge is always
ready to solve those problems, thus generating a form of circular or self-sufficient
progress, a kind of material merry-go-round.32
It may be that an idea of progress of this kind is shallow in its over-emphasis on
material wants. Social or societal progress and personal moral improvement is no
longer viewed as the result of the rational application of knowledge (structural
modifications that will have unavoidably positive results), but as a question of
individual political or moral choice.
But if the essence of the belief in progress is that through the accumulation of
knowledge and its practical application, mankind can improve at least the material
conditions of human existence, it is clear that the ideology of progress is alive and well,
certainly if a degree of material satisfaction is a pre-condition for happiness. The
economic structures of regulated but basically free markets reflect the promise of
political economy that the market, the mechanism for the generation and satisfaction of
greater and different wants, is the motor of a productive, active and working society. At
the core lies a belief in the progressive improvement of the degree of satisfaction of
material want.
Technological doom
One critique of the prevalent belief in material progress is that it results in increased
technological dependency and determinism: individuals are dominated by the perva-
sive demands of technology, resulting in a loss of individual freedom and thus of
personal fulfilment and happiness. In the extreme form of this critique, technology, as
the main emanation of material progress, represents a threat to our existence: nuclear
Armageddon beckons; or the explosion of human population will leave us with a food-
base vulnerable to the sudden and uncontrollable proliferation of deadly diseases,
etc.
Furthermore, whereas Lasch refers to a modern ideology of progress as a simple
belief in a continuous infinite development of knowledge and material transformatidn,
environmental science has posited that there may in fact be limits to this process,
imposed by finite resources. Given an increase in population and finite resources,
progress cannot be continuous; a stage may come where the only progress is in equity
rather than in absolute material wealth. On this view a belief in progress and the
pursuit of material wealth is misguided and dangerous.
Against that it can be argued that mankind does not have the luxury to choose: only
a solid belief in progress (as accumulation of new knowledge) will lead us out of
3o ibid., Rescher refers to polls that show little change in people’s perception of their own happiness
with improvements in their material conditions; also polls that show that people believe there is a
negative correlation between progress and happiness.31 See, e.g.E.A. Fano, "’Wastage of men’: technological progress and unemployment in the United
States", 32 Technology and Culture 264 (July 1991).32 See, e.g.B. Appleyard, Understanding the Present: Science and the Soul of Modern Man (Doubleday,
1992).
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the maze of environmental, technological and practical conundrums already posed by
material progress itself. In other words, if science and technology have their risks they
also have their promise: they are the only possible way to deal with the dangers
inherent within them. Science will cure science, and we are thus inescapably bound to
pursue science in a necessary vicious circle. Some high priests of progress even believe
that the pursuit of all scientific avenues will lead to a heroic future, a city of God created
by humans (taking us back to the early nineteenth-century view of infinitely improv-
able human nature and social conditions): genetic manipulation will weed out unhap-
piness of any sort amongst us!
Progress and cultural imperialism
An often identified danger of a belief in progress is that of cultural annihilation and
(post-) imperialism as well as "crude celebrations of national and racial destiny".33
Since a belief in progress implies that the society progressing is getting better, it is often
contrasted with a society that is judged stagnant at a lower stage of development. Even
if modern-day idealists no longer believe that each individual member of a pre-
industrial society can be improved by contact with the accumulated knowledge of a
society that has "progressed further", the conviction that such communities will benefit
from the introduction of the cultural and material acquisitions of "more advanced"
societies is still prevalent. However, this "introduction" will inevitably result in at least
partial destruction of the culture of the "primitive" society. Furthermore, progressivist
ideology is often dangerously associated with pursuit of racial or national hegemony:
the rhetoric of progress is apt to be destructive of other societies when employed in this
context (whether cloaked in terms of dialectic materialism or in less structured
ways).
Modern belief in progress
But many people continue to believe in progress because they recognise it as the
essence of an existence with hope; it is virtually a religious belief, a belief that gives
purpose to life itself. Lasch, for instance, refers to the belief in progress of some of the
principal historians of progress, such as Nisbet and J.H. Plumb, as well as that of
W. Wagar, and A.J.P. Taylor who said that cultural pessimism is the vice of disgruntled
intellectuals.34 Belief in progress is for many exactly that: a belief without which
existence is meaningless; this is a culturally bound, but widely held view.
It is worth noting that belief in progress is also a conception of history, i.e. a view of
history, a revision of history.35 I have already pointed out that some see a scientific
society as one that is apt to continue; that it precludes the rise and fall of nations. It may
also be that, to adapt Fukuyama’s famous dictum, the scientific society is the death of
33 See Lasch, above n.10.
34 ibid.
35 See, e.g.A.M. Melzer, J. Weinberger, M.R. Zinman (eds) History and the Idea of Progress (Cornell
University Press, 1995); C. Dawson, Progress and Religion: an Historical Enquiry (Sheed & Ward, 1929);
J.A. Bernstein, Progress and the Search for Meaning: a Philosophical and Historical Enquiry (Fairleigh
Dickinson University Press, 1993).
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history.36 Inevitably, a progressivist or scientific society is one that relies heavily on
communication, is anti-isolationist and therefore global; if history is the competitive
striving of nations and ideologies, then a scientific society is indeed the death of history
because it is anti-ideological, because rationalist, and anti-national, because national
boundaries mean nothing to knowledge and science.
BELIEF IN PROGRESS, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
Progress and property
An individual may either believe in progress or not, but implicit belief in the benefits
of progress is undeniably embedded in western culture. Growing numbers of Euro-
peans believed, during the nineteenth century and beyond, that society would benefit
from bestowing (property rights as) incentives on authors and inventors to engage in
creative work and disseminate its results. That is still a fundamentally accepted notion,
perfectly rational within the surrounding cultural constructs of a capitalist western
democracy.37 It is reflected in intellectual property law in general, and in patents law in
particular.38
Key characteristics of belief in progress
Before exploring how intellectual property law reflects a belief in progress, it is as well
to recapitulate the key characteristics of such a belief as they have emerged from the
foregoing account. The constituent elements of the contemporary belief in progress,
largely shorn of its heroic elements and reduced to a belief in material advancement can
be said to be: (1) belief in the limitless accumulation of new knowledge; (2) belief in the
essential contribution of the individual mind to the accumulation of valuable new
knowledge; (3) belief in the need and potential for practical application of knowledge;
(4) belief that material acquisition is good; (5) belief that scientific and technological
development will allow an ever-expanding and ever-changing need for material
satisfaction to be met; and (6) belief in the autonomous generation of complex social
organisation to allow the goal of material gratification of all to be met. A progressivist
view thus emphasises creativity, the constant creation of the new, at the expense of
imitation, repetition, reinterpretation of the old; the gratification of material wants
above all other, including spiritual needs; and individuality. It also tends to automat-
ically equate technological change with an increase in the welfare of the individual,
elevating innovation to the position of a good per se.
The following paragraphs contain an initial exploration of how some of the charac-
teristics of the contemporary belief in progress are reflected in the structures and
principles of intellectual property law.
36 E Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York Free Press, 1992).
37 Important in a materialist and progressivist society is the concept of choice and free will:
democracy itself reflects the perceived need to allow the people themselves to participate in the
fundamental choices of society.38 An important point here is that intellectual property is a reflection of materialist progress, rather
than a cause of it; see further n.9.
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Belief in the limitless accumulation of new knowledge: novelty, flexibility, and
limited terms
Novelty
A requirement of novelty in one form or another is fundamental to the statutory forms
of intellectual property. Knowledge that is not novel is not patentable, and an express
requirement of novelty also applies in designs law.39 Intellectual property law thus
emphasises the value of the new over the old, and reflects the progressivist emphasis
on the accumulation of new knowledge as the basis for improvement of society.
Intellectual property stresses the value of creation over imitation. The law also recog-
nises no boundaries to the human potential for generating new knowledge.
Although the emphasis of progress thinking is on new knowledge, it also recognises
that new breakthroughs can only be made by those who have access to existing
knowledge. Knowledge is cumulative and the ability to acquire, assimilate but also
share and communicate knowledge is vital to the notion of progress. In terms of
novelty this is reflected in the fact that although some form of novelty is required, such
novelty need not be great: in that which is novel there is commonly much that is old.
For instance, in copyright, the level of originality is low, in particular in Australia,4° and
originality does not equate to a universal test of novelty in any case, requiring only
independent creation. In patents law, although inventiveness is now assessed in the
light of global data, all that is required is that the inventive step not be obvious to a
person skilled in the art. Intellectual property law recognises the importance of
communication of knowledge in other ways as well: through the temporary nature of
rights; through such principles as the idea/expression distinction in copyright law and
the requirement of enabling publication in patents law.
Flexibility
The courts have consistently held that intellectual property law should be interpreted
flexibly enough to accommodate whatever new knowledge or new technology may be
invented in the future. Thus the High Court in Grain Pool of WAv The Commonwealth
said: "A universal feature of the twentieth century has been the dynamic progress and
momentum of science and technology. The principal inventions of the ~entury, which
include flight, applied nuclear fission, informatics and biogenetics were all undis-
covered, and for the most part unconceived, in 1900. Yet the Constitution certainly
envisaged that the Commonwealth was entering an age of special technological
inventiveness. So much can be seen in the specific provision of the post and tele-
communications power in such wide terms. Given the objects of the head of power,
which include the facilitation and protection of intellectual inventiveness within
Australia, it would be specially destructive of the achievement of those objects if the
grant of power were to be attached--even as a primary reference point--to the
39 The requirement of originality in copyright law is often said not to be a requirement of novelty;
for practical purposes it amounts to little else. In terms of trade marks law, the requirement of
distinctiveness incorporates a limited novelty requirement: a mark that is not new in terms of its use
in relation to a class of goods or services is not likely to be sufficiently distinctive. A mark that is not
new to some degree is also more likely to be confusing or deceptive.40 See Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v Telstra Corp Ltd [2002] EC.A.EC. 112 (May 15, 2002).
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particular notions which, up to 1900, ’copyrights, patents of inventions and designs
and trade marks’ had been protected by the law. I do not believe that such an approach
is necessary. It is certainly not desirable." (at HCA paras [131]-[132]); and further: "To
the full extent that the language of the Constitution warrants and that other important
values which it upholds permit, meaning should be given to a provision such as
s.51(xviii) in a way that allows the section to respond to the very great variety of
inventiveness that may be considered by the Federal Parliament to necessitate protec-
tion for the ’products of intellectual effort’. The future directions of such inventiveness
are unknowable and likely to outstrip even our present vivid imaginations." (at HCA
para.[133]).41 These passages closely reflect what the High Court said almost half a
century earlier in the NRDC case.42
Temporariness
Intellectual property rights are also temporary, i.e. most (except for rights related to
goodwill) are granted for a limited period. Theoretically new knowledge produced will
eventually be available to society, which will be able to employ it without restrictions.
A more sceptical view might suggest that the temporariness of exclusive rights
recognises that most knowledge rapidly becomes obsolete. In other words, knowledge
is overtaken by new knowledge and new applications of knowledge. In any case, the
periodicity clearly implies a belief in constant progress by accumulation of new
knowledge. Knowledge is never finite, always there to be overtaken and added to.
Belief in the essential contribution of the individual mind to the accumulation of
new knowledge: individuality in intellectual property law
The notion of individual human ingeniousness is fundamental to progress thinking.
The accumulation of knowledge does not happen automatically or socially, but is
always connected to individual creativity. Intellectual property law reflects this insis-
tence on the importance of the contribution of the individual mind. Both in copyright
and in patents law the grant of exclusive rights is dependent on the contribution by a
named individual author or inventor.43 Copyright law requires that a work originate
with the author, and that the work carry at least a minimal authorial imprint. Patents
law makes the grant of a monopoly dependent on the identification of at leasf a
"scintilla" of human inventiveness. Even in a period when inventions are commonly
made by teams working systematically with corporate or fiscal resources, the scale of
investment is not sufficient to warrant a grant of a patent without the necessary spark
of human inventiveness. This notion of inventiveness is a difficult one in a hi-tech
context, but it remains a mainstay of patents law.44
41 Other examples of judicial insistence on flexible accommodation of new technologies are to be
found in cases regarding computer-implemented inventions: see, e.g. International Business Machines
Corp v Smith (1992) AoI.P.C. 90-853.42 National Research Development Corp v Commission of Patents [1959] 102 C.L.R. 252.
43 Even if a work or invention is created by a group, individuals must be nominated, and will be
treated as joint authors or inventors.44 See, e.g. Genentech Inc v Wellcome Foundation Ltd (1989) 15 I.P.R. 423. Recently in Australia the
standard of inventiveness in patents law has been increased: see the Patents Amendment Act 2001
(Cth).
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Belief in the need and the potential for practical application of knowledge:
Practical application and material expression in intellectual property law
Progressivism stresses not the value of knowledge or education per se but the practical
use of knowledge. Central to the belief in material progress is the notion that new
technology will automatically enhance human welfare. Intellectual property stresses
material advantage, i.e. putting knowledge to a practical use. A patent will only be
granted for an invention that has industrial application, and is useful in the patent law
sense, i.e. will obtain the results that it claims. Theoretical knowledge, such as discov-
eries of laws of nature, is excluded from reward: it is not patentable subject-matter. It
is only through participation in the market that an intellectual property owner will
derive any income or reward, i.e. it is only if there is some actual uptake of the technology
that the patentee will benefit. Patents law also does not distinguish between technolo-
gies on the basis of their actual potential for the improvement of human welfare. It is
a neutral system that makes no value judgments: any technology, whether product or
process, as long as it is new, inventive and relevant to the economy, will do for the grant
of a monopoly. Designs law as well, reflects an emphasis on the practical application or
expression of new ideas.
In copyright law it is only when ideas are condensed into some useful format that
they attract exclusive statutory rights; ideas per se do not have copyright protection.
Again the law does not attempt to make any a priori value judgement about works; the
courts have consistently shied away from making decisions about subsistence of
copyright protection on the basis of aesthetic, artistic or, other value-laden criteria.45
The nature of the rights that come with intellectual property is also illustrative: they
are overwhelmingly rights to material exploitation, rather than authorial connection: the
right to publish, to reproduce, etc., copyright works, to exploit patented inventions, to
apply registered designs, etc. Moral rights in copyright might illustrate how it need not
be thus; in other words, how rights can have a non-material or non-exploitative
character. Yet even in that context it can and has been argued that the main effect of
moral rights is to strengthen the economic position of the author.46 Although in most
national regimes moral rights cannot generally be waived, there is usually provision for
waiver or consent in individual cases.
Belief that material acquisition is good; that scientific and technological
development will allow an ever expanding and ever changing need for material
satisfaction to be met, by means of complex social organisation: intellectual
property’s rewards
An essential element of progressivist thought is that practical advantages should
accumulate to the world, people as a whole, not be reserved to a chosen few (see
above). Intellectual property reflects this, through its subjection of technology to the
forces of the market, i.e. of individual consumer choice. Rewards for intellectual
45 The exception to the rule is works of artistic craftsmanship, but even there the courts have
attempted to reduce the need to make an artistic judgment as far as possible to the application of
objective criteria: see Coogi Australia Pty Ltd v Hysport International Pty Ltd [1998] EC.A. 1059 (August
21, 1998).
46 See, e.g. Copyright Law Review Committee, Report on Moral Rights (Australia 1988).
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endeavour are not direct but via exploitation in the marketplace.47 In other words, the
promise of intellectual property law is to subject innovation to ex post decisions by the
market, rather than ex ante decisions by political decision-makers. Thus individual
want and technological change are in a sense co-ordinated. The laws of supply and
demand will mean that the most popular technologies are made available at the best
prices, thus maximising the satisfaction of individual want. Intellectual property does
not value or reward knowledge per se, but permits and encourages the maximum
circulation of practical intellectual goods through the operation of markets. In fact,
intellectual property law is structured as it is precisely to deny political elites the power
to grant monopolies.48
PROGRESS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: SOME RECENT EXAMPLES
Recent debates
The ideology of material progress is under attack in society as a whole, be it by
environmentalists, religious groups or radical political activists. Intellectual property
law forms an important battleground for the fight between belief and scepticism about
the promises of progress. Recent debates concerning intellectual property policy reflect
increasingly divergent opinions about the role of progress in modern society.49 For
instance, the following two controversies in IP have profound resonance in terms of
scepticism about, or belief in progress:
Intellectual property rights over traditional art and knowledge: the social struc-
tures surrounding artistic and technical expression in some traditional indigenous
societies are fundamentally at odds with most of the tenets of intellectual property
law. Hence the difficult debate concerning the accommodation of traditional
knowledge and art within intellectual property versus the development of sui
generis forms of protection. Hence also the struggle of the courts to find legal
means to accommodate the aspirations of aboriginal people in Australia in the
context of copyright law.s° If traditional indigenous communities reject the
47 That does not mean that direct rewards for intellectual endeavour do not exist: the academic merit
system is one example. For a comparison with a system which did grant direct rewards for invention,
see W. van Caenegem, "Inventions in Russia: From public Good to Private Property" (1993) 4 A.I.P.J.
232.
48 Merges makes this point forcefully: the grant of intellectual property powers in the US Constitu-
tion "was intended to provide a positive incentive for technological and literary progress while
avoiding the abuse of monopoly privileges" (see P. Merges, "The Proper Scope of the Copyright and
Patent Power", below n.62, at p.47). If the choice is between the grant of monopolies by political
processes or by neutral administrative processes, the latter is clearly the more beneficial in terms of
social welfare.
49 See, e.g.P.A. David, "The evolution of intellectual property institutions", MERIT Research
Memorandum 93-009, 1993. See also W. Alderson, V. Terpstra, S.J. Shapiro (eds), Patents and Progress,
The Sources and Impact of Advancing Technology (RD Irwin Inc, 1965).50 See, e.g. Yumbulul v Reserve Bank of Australia (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481; Milpurrurru v Indofurn (1995) 30
I.P.R. 209.
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western view of progress, favouring adherence to tradition over the search for
novelty, respect for the natural environment and living things over blind adher-
ence to the technological paradigm, sociability over individualism, and continuity
over temporariness, then it is difficult to see how traditional knowledge and art
can be accommodated within intellectual property law. From this point of view
there is no avoiding the conclusion that only custom-made forms of protection are
appropriate.
Patentability and human health: both at the level of patentability of human
treatment methods within Australia and at the level of patentability of essential
medicines in underdeveloped countries. This debates pits the rights of the individ-
ual against progressivist dogma. One view is that it is acceptable that individuals
suffer for the sake of the progress of society as a whole. The other view says that
this takes progressivist instrumentalism too far, at least in some circumstances, as
is further exposed below.
Modern society’s ambiguous attitude towards the idea of progress lies close to the
surface of the above-mentioned debates. Some recent decisions of Australian courts are
analysed further in that light below: first, the cases of Rescare51 and Bristol-Myers
Squibb52 about patents over medical treatment methods (with an aside to the High
Court’s remarks in the Grain Pool53 case); and secondly, the Bulun Bulun case, about
copyright in aboriginal art.
Rescare, Bristol-Myers Squibb and The Grain Pool of WAv The Commonwealth
In both Rescare and Bristol-Myers Squibb, one of the legal issues was whether methods
of human treatment, as opposed to products used in human treatment--such as
pharmaceutical substancesJwere patentable subject-matter. This question had never
been bindingly determined by an Australian court, certainly where the method is
therapeutic or diagnostic rather than cosmetic. Ultimately the question was answered
in the affirmative.54
The cost implications of patent grant are regularly rehearsed: monopolies lessen
competition and increase prices thus imposing a financial and economic cost on society.
But at the heart of the question in Rescare and Bristol-Myers lies a more perverse trade-
off: to serve the public interest of encouraging research into new treatment methods, i.e.
the progress of medicine, the patentee is to be granted the statutory power to deny a
suffering patient the private right to the most effective treatment.55 In other words, the
relief of actual suffering will be traded off against the promise of speculative future
51 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare Ltd (1994) 50 EC.R. 1 and Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Ltd v Rescare
Ltd (1992) 25 I.P.R. 119.
s2 Bristol-Myers Squib Co v F.H. Faulding & Co Ltd [1998] EC.A. 860 (July 22, 1998); and Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co v F.H. Faulding & Co Ltd [2000] F.C.A. 316 (March 22, 2000).
53 The Grain Pool of WAv The Commonwealth [2000] H.C.A. 14 (March 23, 2000).
54 One of the major implications of the decisions is that new and inventive uses and methods of
administering known pharmaceutical substances are confirmed as patentable subject-matter.
55 The same applies when we consider patents over pharmaceutical substances, but is not so starkly
presented since the question of patentability of drugs is well settled. At the international level things
are different: the HIV/AIDS drug patents issue is the best example.
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advances in technology. Confirming patentability, as a majority of the Full Federal
Court ultimately did, implies confidence that knowledge can and will be applied to the
benefit of society as a whole, and that patents grant has a significant role to play in that
process. The implication that an element of unquestioning belief in the pursuit of
material progress is at work is inescapable. A sceptic might have pointed out that
material progress comes at a cost, its benefits are not universally shared, and its
untrammelled pursuit may destroy the globe. The sacrifice of the nominal patient who
is denied medical treatment because of the enforcement of patent rights, may in fact
come at a cost not only to herself, but also to society as a whole.
The view of the majority of judges in both cases was that if the central tenet of patents
law holds true, i.e. that patent grant encourages innovation, then there is nothing to be
gained from excising some area of technology, such as medical treatment methods,
from patentability.56 Working within the constraints of the system, this makes perfect
sense. Even judges who came to the opposite conclusion about patentability shared the
view that knowledge and information is exchanged, not for its own sake, but for the
practical purpose of improving treatment of patients. Thus Sheppard J. opposed patent
grant not so much because he was sceptical about the trade-off between individual
suffering and general progress, but because he felt patenting would disturb established
patterns of teaching, learning and communication.
Questions about the place of patents law in the pursuit of material progress are only
implicit in these cases, partly because the connection between intellectual property and
the pursuit of progress remains unexpressed in Australian legislation. Unlike in the
United States,57 the functional or instrumental role of intellectual property law as an
institution promoting "progress" is not recognised expressly in the constitution of
Australia (nor in the laws of the United Kingdom). In the Constitution of the Com-
monwealth of Australia, the Commonwealth was granted the power over intellectual
property, because differences in regulation between the various states would have
caused many difficulties.58 There is no functional limitation on the power, i.e. parlia-
ment is not limited to applying the power to a certain end, as long as the legislation is
concerned with intellectual property. Nonetheless the High Court placed a pro-
gressivist gloss on the power in Grain Pool of WAv The Commonwealth: "Upon this basis,
the lawmaking power with respect to ’patents of inventions’ within s.51(xviii) involves
the provision by the state to the grantee of exclusive rights for a limited time to exploit,
and to authorise other persons to exploit, a novel object or process of potential benefit to
the community in respect of which a patent may be granted and which is recorded in a
56 In their view this argument gains added strength from the fact that pharmaceutical substances are
patentable.57 See further below n.62.
58 Furthermore, by the time of federation, intellectual property law was the subject of important
multilateral treaty systems, the Berne Convention concerning copyright, and the Paris Convention
concerning industrial property. But in interpreting the extent of the power, the courts have predictably
examined the essential characteristics of intellectual property law (i.e. of patents, designs, copyright
and trade marks law). In Grain Pool of WAv The Commonwealth, the Court said: "The specific inclusion
of s.51(xviii) in the Australian Constitution affords a further reason for assigning to s.51(xviii) a
meaning that permits the protection of ’products of intellectual effort’ in the variety in which such
products now manifest themselves and the even greater variety in which they can be expected to
appear in the future." (at HCA para.[134]).
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public register upon conditions of disclosure. This is the bedrock. Nothing more is
required by the ’really essential characteristics’ of ’patents of inventions’ ,,.59
In fact nothing in intellectual property law in Australia actually requires a "potential
benefit to the community". Patents for inventions will be granted whether or not the
invention will benefit the community: this is not the nature of the patentability enquiry.
The most trivial invention (a new-fangled rattle) is equally entitled to a patent as a life-
saving one (a cure for cancer). What emerges from the terms used by the Court, is that
new technology is automatically equated with benefit to the community, i.e. a strong
belief that the application of knowledge results in social progress in the wide sense, i.e.
benefits society as a whole.
The Court in Grain Pool of WA also referred to the US Constitution, which is in fact
quite different from the Australian constitution in this regard, since it expressly
imposes a functional limitation on the power to legislate with respect to intellectual
property. In the United States, the constitutional head of power authorises Congress "to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts" by granting exclusive rights to authors
and inventors "for limited times’’6° (emphasis added). The High Court made no further
reference to the functional limitations that this imposes on the power of Congress,
understandably so, as the Australian constitution does not impose this limitation.
Whereas the purpose of the Australian provision was in fact simply to grant the
power to the Federal Parliament, the purpose of the US provision was to grant and limit
the power, to prevent abusive grants of monopoly. In the United States the functional
limitation has an important impact, and the courts have used the terms "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts" to ensure that intellectual property laws grant
monopolies over knowledge that is new or inventive, and not over existing knowl-
edge.61 An unspoken prejudice lies in the constitutional terminology: that technological
change will indeed benefit society as a whole; this is the essential characteristic of a
belief in progress.
Bulun Butun v R & TT Textiles Pty Ltd
Thinking about intellectual property law in terms of belief in progress, reveals that
intellectual property regimes are determined by certain cultural paradigms.62 However,
the pursuit of material progress is not common, or at least not as central, to all cultures.
The position of indigenous culture and knowledge in some (post-) industrial societies
acutely illustrates this point. In Australia, the structures of intellectual property law,
including patents law, do not necessarily conform to the rules and customs concerning
control of knowledge in traditional indigenous communities. The law’s uniform
59 At HCA para.[135]; emphasis added. The case concerned the question whether the Plant Variety
Rights Act 1987 (Cth) fell within the intellectual property power of the commonwealth (i.e. within by
s.51(xviii) of the Constitution).
60 Constitution of the United States of America, Art.l, s.8.
61 As Merges explains it, monopolies encourage rent-seeking behaviour from interest groups that
results in a deadweight loss; this effect is deflected if the advantage to society in terms of new
discoveries, etc., outweighs the cost to society of granting a private monopoly: see P. Merges, "The
Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power" (2000) Harvard Journal on Legislation 45.
62 See in this vein, R.J. Coombe, "Objects of property and subjects of politics: intellectual property
laws and democratic dialogue", (1991) Texas L.Ro 69, 1853.
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insistence on novelty and inventiveness, on individuality of creation, and on personal
property and ownership, are ill suited to communal control, validation through
tradition, oral transmission, and religious significance of knowledge and expres-
sion.63
In Bulun Bulun Von Doussa J. recognised the fundamental clash between aboriginal
and western notions of control over knowledge. He said:
"These proceedings represent another step by Aboriginal people to have communal
title in their traditional ritual knowledge, and in particular in their artwork, recog-
nised and protected by the Australian legal system. The inadequacies of statutory
remedies under the Copyright Act 1976 as a means of protecting communal owner-
ship have been noted in earlier decisions of this Court: see Yumbulul v Reserve Bank
of Australia (1991) 21 I.P.R. 481 at 490 and Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty Ltd (1994) 54
EC.R. 240 at 247. See also McKeough and Stewart ’Intellectual Property and the
Dreaming’, published in Indigenous Australia and the Law, Johnston, Hinton & Rigney
eds (1997); Henderson ’What’s in a Painting? The Cultural Harm of Unauthorised
Reproduction’ (1995) 17 Syd Law Rev 591 at 593; Ellison, ’Unauthorised Reproduc-
tion of Traditional Aboriginal Art’ (1994) 17 U.N.S.W.L.J. 327; and ’Stopping the Rip-
Offs: Intellectual Property Protection for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
Peoples’ (1994, National Capital Printing) where it was said at p.6: ’While joint
authorship of a work by two or more authors is recognised by the Copyright Act,
collective ownership by reference to any other criterion, for example, membership of
the author of a community whose customary laws invest the community with
ownership of any creation of its members is not recognised’."
The courts may make some attempt to reconcile opposing views by adopting innova-
tive legal constructs as von Doussa J. did in this case; but this does not alter the fact that
it is an attempt to reconcile the irreconcilable. At the bottom lies a different view of
society and of the place of knowledge in society, of progress as promise versus progress
as threat: to cohesion, to tradition, to belief, as well as a material threat to health and
environment. Bulun Bulun is a reminder that the ideology of material progress which
underpins much of intellectual property law is not universally shared.
CONCLUSION
Many current controversies in intellectual property law can be analysed in terms of
contrasting opinions about progress. But "traditional" intellectual property is firmly
63 See M. Blakeney, "Bioprospecting and the protection of traditional medical knowledge of indige-
nous peoples: an Australian perspective" [1997] E.I.P.R. 198; P. Drahos, "Indigenous knowledge and
the duties of intellectual property owners" (1997) 11 IoP.J. 179; L.A. Whitt, "Indigenous peoples,
intellectual property and the new imperial science" (1998) Oklahoma City University Law Review 211;
C. Haight Farley, "Protecting folklore of indigenous peoples: is intellectual property the answer?"
(1997) Connecticut L.R. 30, 1; see D.R. Headrick, The tentacles of progress: technology transfer in the age of
imperialism, 1850-1940 (Oxford University Press, 1988). As to the possible recognition of communal title
to traditional ritual knowledge in Aboriginal communities, see also John Bulun Bulun v R. & T.T. Textiles
Pty Ltd [1998] EC.A. 1082 (September 3, 1998); Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pry Ltd (1994) 54 EC.R. 240.
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anchored to a world view in which the pursuit of material progress plays a central role.
The economic motor and political bedrock of this pursuit is the competitive application
of new knowledge within the framework of proprietary rights. However, this frame-
work is now more frequently questioned, globally and nationally, expressly or implic-
itly. It remains to be seen to what extent, in the context of current global debates about
intellectual property, the fundamental preconceptions about progress that underlie IP
will come up for debate. History reveals that progress is a relative concept, that its
fruits are rarely universally shared, and that the dogmatic pursuit of material progress
can come at a considerable social, environmental and cultural cost. It is equally clear
that intellectual property law plays an important institutional role in fulfilling the
promises of progress. Maybe it can play an increasing role in countering its threats.
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